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Abstract 
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type 
reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no 
unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true 
then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The 
main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible 
reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction. 
 
 
 
1.  Short introduction 
 
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments 
against reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. The MR 
argument, following Putnam (1967) and Fodor (1974), is widely known: higher-level 
properties M possess multiple lower-level realizers or instantiations. Since the realizers are 
“drastically heterogeneous”, no bi-conditionals between higher-level M-types and lower-
level P-types can be established. But this means that the higher-order laws of the special 
sciences cannot be reduced to lower-level laws, since, following the classic account of 
theory reduction by Nagel (1961), the failure of M/P-biconditionals is equivalent to the 
non-existence of unique bridge laws between M and P. The upshot is that in the reducing 
science the unifying power of the higher-level law gets lost and that at best a 
generalization over an unsystematic disjunction of lower-level properties can be retained. 
Hence, type-reductionism fails. 
 
The MR argument is indeed a remarkable argument. What really makes it remarkable is 
the curious fact that, given its simplicity and generality, the argument came surprisingly 
late and entirely unexpectedly. In retrospect it seems almost unbelievable how it could 
have been overlooked for so long. Perhaps the argument was overlooked because, in a 
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very elementary sense, the argument is bogus. This might also be the implicit reason why 
working scientists are usually not alarmed by this argument. Hence, the primary task of 
this paper is to uncover the bogus nature of the MR argument by showing that MR is not a 
unique phenomenon, but rather spans a variety of classes of MR cases. In a slogan: MR is 
itself “multi-realized”. The paper aims to develop a taxonomy of the multiplicity of MR 
cases and to sketch corresponding possible reductionist strategies. 
 
 
2.  Shared intrinsic properties 
 
MR cases are omnipresent. As a starter, let us consider an easy and apparently innocuous 
example: the case of water. Water is usually identified with H2O. From a more fine-
grained perspective, however, water molecules come in different varieties: hydrogen oxide 
1H2O, deuterium oxide D2O and tritium oxide T2O, or, accordingly, regular water, heavy 
water and tritiated water. This three-fold distinction between the three types of water can 
of course be traced back to the distinction between the three isotopes of the hydrogen 
atom: protium 1H, deuterium D and tritium T, where in the case of deuterium one and in 
the case of tritium two further neutrons are added to the proton of the regular hydrogen 
nucleus (hence, D=2H and T=3H). 
 
This setting already includes several MR scenarios: First, water is multiply realized as 
regular, heavy and tritiated water; second, water molecules are multiply realized as 1H2O, 
D2O and T2O; third, hydrogen is multiply realized by means of the isotopes protium, 
deuterium and tritium; and fourth, the hydrogen nucleus is multirealizable as one proton, 
the compound of a proton and a neutron, and the compound of a proton and two 
neutrons. While all this is well known, it seems pretty clear that no working scientist ever 
believed that because of these various MR cases there is a pressing problem with the 
reduction of molecular chemistry to atomic physics or the like. This is not to say that there 
might not very well exist problems in reducing chemistry to physics, but those problems 
do not, in any obvious manner, stem from the MR scenarios just mentioned. 
 
For the sake of our argument, we may assume a bundle ontology point of view. We may 
describe the entities involved in MR scenarios as bundles of properties. The case of water 
is a particularly handsome case in this respect since we may simply identify the “nucleonic 
content” of the various isotopes with their basic properties, which we shall call the p-
property and the n-property. To simplify things, let us neglect the oxygen nucleus and just 
concentrate on the hydrogen atoms. Hence, the n-property of 1H2O is 0, while for D2O it is 
2 and for T2O it is 4. In contrast to this, the p-property of all isotopes is the same, namely 2. 
Now, most of the laws which govern the behaviour of water can be traced back to the p-
property of the three water isotopes. Since the p-property of 1H2O, D2O and T2O is the 
same, the electromagnetic properties and, hence, most of the chemical properties are the 
same. Only in case where the n-property counts (e.g., when the mass of the atoms comes 
into play) do differences between the three realizations of water occur. In these cases, 
however, we are no longer facing an MR scenario, since we are not dealing with three 
instantiations of one kind, but rather with three different kinds. In contrast, in the true MR 
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case, where we may consider water as one kind with laws quantifying over this water 
kind, the behavior of this kind and hence the water laws can be reduced to the p-property 
of the isotopes, which are the same for the different instantiations 1H2O, D2O and T2O.  
 
It can of course easily be seen why the MR case of water isn’t a problematic case at all. For 
in general, water laws quantify over p-properties. And hence, although water isotopes 
differ in n-properties, this difference doesn’t count for the typical water properties, which 
are, as p-properties, one and the same for the three isotopes. Thus, from the p-property 
perspective, the MR scenario collapses. The more general upshot is that higher-level laws 
in many cases do not quantify over all the properties – the whole property bundle – of the 
higher-level entities but only over a suitable subset – a partial property bundle, perhaps 
only one property – thereof. This motivates to the following more general conclusion: 
Higher-level laws quantify over causally relevant higher order properties of the supposed higher 
order entities only. In many merely superficial MR cases it is therefore sufficient for a full-
blown type-reduction (in a Nagelian schema of reduction or perhaps in a some more 
refined way) to reduce the reduction-relevant properties to causally relevant lower-level 
properties which the multiple realizers share. In the case of water such causally or 
reduction-relevant properties are the p-properties of the isotopes. Whether the realizers 
differ in other properties doesn’t affect a successful type-reduction at all. 
 
 
3.  Family resemblances and domain-specific reductions 
 
We’ve highlighted an important and at the same time innocuous category of MR cases: the 
class of shared intrinsic properties of the realizers. But of course there’s more to come. Let 
us consider another kind of example. “Games” seem to provide an interesting case of MR 
as well – just think of soccer games, card games, Olympic games, children’s games, 
gladiator’s games etc. The examples also seem to instantiate “drastically heterogeneous” 
cases, a crucial ingredient not fulfilled in the case of shared intrinsic properties. However, 
as Wittgenstein has forcefully argued, “game” is a family concept: the members of a family 
show “…a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (Wittgenstein 
1953, § 66), but there is no single property shared by all the members (cluster concepts are 
similar cases). Let’s assume Wittgenstein is right on this. Insofar as the case of games 
provides a genuine MR case, it does obviously not belong into the MR-class of shared 
intrinsic properties. But we get a quick explanation at hand: while there is no single 
property shared by all the family members, there are nevertheless certain properties 
shared within certain member sub-classes. We must therefore simply restrict our shared-
intrinsic-properties approach to such sub-classes to demystify family concept cases as MR 
cases. 
 
This is actually the general strategy of David Lewis (1969) in his early reaction on Putnam. 
Lewis promotes a “restricted” type-type-identity theory allowing for domain-specific 
reductions. Take the case of “pain” as an infamous example of MR. Under Lewis’ account 
the reductionist should rather restrict herself to certain subclasses or subtypes. From the 
same logic Lewis denies viewing pain as a natural kind. There may be pain-in-men, pain-
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in-dogs, pain-in-Martians, pain-in-robots, or what have you, but there is no such general 
kind as pain. So Lewis and Wittgenstein in a sense meet: the idea of domain-specific 
reductions harmonizes with the case of family types, since suitable sub-types may exactly 
be those which share certain lower-level properties. And, of course, such domain-specific 
cases then come out, again, as innocuous shared-lower-level-properties-cases.  
 
The “Wittgenstein-Lewis-view” aligns with the empirical fact that apparently nobody is 
able to present non-trivial and interesting generalizations over the class of all pain or game 
realizers. There simply are no overall pain or game laws, but just laws about suitable 
subclasses. This echoes Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialist attitude: lacking a shared – let alone 
essential – property, no law-like generalizations “all F’s are G’s” over “family types” F and 
G exist. Under Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance it becomes plausible why we 
have pain and game concepts (and therefore perhaps mistakenly assume the existence of 
unanimous pain or game generalizations), but why we should at the same time not expect 
the existence of general pain or game laws – after all, over which property should they 
quantify? 
 
 
4.  The empirical nature of MR, causal powers and functional reduction 
 
It might seem, however, that we have turned the logic of the MR argument on its head: 
we’ve argued for the impossibility of general pain or game laws under the presupposition 
that no shared intrinsic pain or game properties exists. But the MR argument is meant as 
an argument for the possibility of just the opposite: the possibility of law-like 
generalizations over drastically heterogeneous realizers. And one way to spell out drastic 
heterogeneity is to reject shared intrinsic properties. The systematic question behind all 
this is of course whether the MR argument should be considered an empirical or an a 
priori argument. Lawrence Shapiro (2000, 2004) has given a number of reasons in favour 
of the view that MR is a matter of nomological rather than logical possibility, but perhaps 
no deep metaphysical consideration is necessary here. Not only should it be obvious that 
we cannot infer about the MR status of the world from mere a priori considerations – the 
empirical nature of the MR thesis has also been made explicit in the statements of MR 
proponents themselves: “These are not supposed to be knock-down reasons; they couldn't be, 
given that the question of whether reductionism is too strong is finally an empirical question. The 
world could turn out to be such that every kind corresponds to a physical kind … It’s just that, as 
things stand, it seems very unlikely…” (Fodor 1974, p. 102-103). 
 
As so often in philosophy discourse the question is on which side of the debate the main 
burden of proof lies. But even if MR proponents accept the main burden, this wouldn’t 
settle the issue because, as they see it, the empirical evidence is already on their side (cf. 
Fodor: “as things stand”). It seems therefore more promising to tackle the issue from 
another angle and to ask how to individuate the various allegedly existing kinds in an 
empirical science. Jaegwon Kim (1998, 2006) has argued that in order to be empirically 
dignified kinds the higher order kinds must be individuated by means of their causal 
roles. This is the key idea of Kim’s account of functional reduction. His model involves 
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two steps: firstly, to identify the causal role of the higher order M’s and, secondly, to 
identify the lower-level realizers exactly by means of their causal role. 
 
Note that under a more abstract description of this model to individuate something 
causally means to reconstrue it on purely relational grounds. Hence, a property defined by 
its causal role, and by its causal role alone, is a relational property only. We follow up on 
this point in the next section. But there are two important consequences from Kim’s 
account of functional reduction. One is his well-known causal exclusion argument. The 
argument in brief is that there is no causal work left for the higher order entities, if we 
accept the otherwise convincing assumptions of the supervenience of M over P and the 
causal closure of P – and unless one is not willing to accept a systematic causal 
overdetermination. More precisely, under the assumption that higher-level tokens 
supervene on lower-level tokens and that any fundamental physical token has a sufficient 
fundamental physical cause, if it has a cause at all, the supposed extra-causal efficacy of 
higher-level tokens must be excluded. Functional reduction implies that, as Kim would 
have it, causation “drains down” from the allegedly causal power of the higher-level to the 
lower-level. 
 
Another consequence concerns the widespread talk of “cross-classification”. As many non-
reductionists put it: higher order properties cross-classify the lower-level ones. But as Kim 
(1998, p. 69) has pointed out, this can only reasonably be maintained if one is willing to 
give up supervenience. For in order for two taxonomies to cross-classify, the possibility is 
admitted that the higher-level taxonomic class makes causally effective distinctions not 
made by the lower-level class. And this is a clear failure of supervenience. Cross-
classifying taxonomies define, as it were, conflicting causal profiles. Since, however, only 
non-reductionists of an explicit non-physicalist inclination are willing to give up 
supervenience in this sense, the talk of cross-classification turns out as rather loose talk not 
suited to spell out the consequences of MR. MR itself does not imply cross-classification. 
Intended as an anti-reductionist argument, the MR argument emphasizes the drastically 
heterogeneous nature of the realizers, but it does not imply any mysteriously conflicting 
causal profiles. 
 
To sum up this interim section: MR must be understood as an empirical phenomenon. 
Both MR-proponents and opponents accuse each other not to have the empirical evidence 
on their side, but it is far less controversial to demand from those, who claim a higher-
level autonomy, to individuate their thus claimed entities and properties by means of a 
scientifically dignified procedure, hence, to individuate entities and properties by means 
of their causal roles. From this it can clearly be seen that MR does not imply cross-
classification but that properties may be individuated purely relationally. This point 
should be considered now. 
 
 
5.  Shared relational properties 
 
Let’s take another MR example: the case of the harmonic oscillator. This is actually a clear 
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case of MR, harmonic oscillators are multi-realizable by a plethora of physical systems: 
pendula, springs, atoms, electromagnetic oscillatory circuits and many more. Do all these 
realizers have certain properties in common? At least this isn’t obvious. Generally 
speaking, a harmonic oscillator is a system where the restoring force is proportional to the 
displacement from the equilibrium position. This can be captured by means of an 
differential equation, the oscillator equation  d2/dt2 x(t) + k x(t) = 0. The oscillator equation 
represents a higher-level law which unifies and systematizes the harmonic behaviour of 
the lower-level realizers in a clean, nice way. And we get interesting generalizations from 
it: whenever something obeys the oscillator equation, it works under a force proportional 
to the displacement. Moreover, the realizers seem to be drastically heterogeneous. This is  
formally reflected by the fact that the equation leaves the nature of the proportionality 
constant k open. In fact, the equation gives no intrinsic but rather a purely relational or 
structural characterization of the harmonic oscillator: all instantiations of a harmonic 
oscillator share the same set of relational properties defined by the oscillator equation. 
 
We have therefore discovered another class of MR cases, the class of shared-relational-
properties-cases, where the harmonic oscillator is a prime example. Unlike the class of 
shared intrinsic properties this class seems to provide more genuine cases of MR in the 
sense that structural laws allow for interesting generalizations and that the realizers may 
differ drastically in any intrinsic, albeit not relational properties. Because of their structural 
commonalities, however, there is again nothing mysterious about such MR cases. 
 
Mention should be made at this point about the remarkable fact that Structural Realism, a 
considerable movement in philosophy of physics claiming to provide the most 
appropriate metaphysics of modern physics, acknowledges primarily relational properties 
only on the most fundamental level (French and Ladyman 2003, Lyre 2009). Physical laws 
it seems, even fundamental ones, prove themselves to a large extend as purely structural 
laws. It has often been a background assumption in the MR debate that the fundamental 
physical laws quantify over fundamental intrinsic properties. From the perspective of 
Structural Realism, however, physics includes basically relational properties and 
collections thereof. On such an account, higher-level properties, if reducible, will 
eventually be reducible to collections of lower-level relational properties only. This by 
itself already undermines the MR argument and is grist on the mills of the shared-
relational-properties view. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue 
this line of thought. 
 
Let us rather consider a further example. Genes are sometimes said to be reducible to 
DNA segments. While this is certainly a gross oversimplification, we may nevertheless use 
it as an illustration in the sense that genes are multirealizable by means of DNA segments. 
On the one hand, this has to do with the degeneracy (redundancy) of the genetic code: 
almost all amino acids are encoded by more than one triplet of nucleotides (DNA codons). 
On the other hand it is possible to think of other biological substrates on which the genetic 
code acts. (In fact, when Watson and Crick discovered the genetic code they soon 
emphasized the fact that it is not the particular bio-substrate that counts but rather, being 
an information-processing code, the purely structural relations between the coding units.) 
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By characterizing certain laws of molecular genetics as structural laws, we abstract from 
the intrinsic properties of the realizers (here: DNA segments) and emphasize the causally 
relevant relations in which they stand. Obviously, the pure structural web of relations can 
be multiply realized, while, a fortiori, the various realizations share just the proper set of 
relational properties which suffice to set up the intended structure. This can be 
generalized: the laws of the higher-level sciences, in many cases, do not pick out special 
heterogeneous kinds that cannot be traced back to more fundamental ones, as Fodor 
would have it, but typically highlight shared relational properties of lower-level realizers 
suited to set up a certain structure.  
 
This conclusion also highlights the promising fact that functional properties can quite 
generally be reconstructed as relational properties by strictly individuating them by their 
causal roles – as pointed out in the preceding section and in accordance with Kim’s 
account of functional reduction. Generally, for two entities to stand in a causal relation 
requires that whenever entity A occurs, B follows as its effect. That is to say, A and B stand 
in an (asymmetric) relation R, where R is likewise to be considered a relational property of 
entities A and B (R is part of the property bundles of both A and B). Therefore, the 
different MR realizers will necessarily fulfil the same causal roles and, hence, must possess 
at least one relational property in common: the relational property connected with their 
common causal role.  
 
 
6.  Further complications and discussions 
 
6.1  Kinds by stipulation 
 
Let’s start over again with another example. Paying one’s dues can be realized in various 
ways: by means of a bank transfer, by either cash or credit card payment, by sending a 
cheque, etc. A clear MR case. In the light of the above, the reductionist might use the 
following counter-strategy: payments are functionally defined. Their realizations may look 
as heterogeneous as they like, they nevertheless fulfill the same causal role in the web of 
economic relationships between different parties on a market. The causal effect of party A 
on party B – as far as A’s dues and their repayment to B are concerned – is, in economic 
terms, the same for every particular realization of the payment. Economic laws do merely 
quantify over causal-relational properties like, for instance, the payment-relation between 
A and B and do not care about the particular instantiation of the payment. 
 
While this is a first step to dissolve the case of payment as an MR example, there is 
perhaps more to it. The question is in fact why this example should be an alarming anti-
reductionist example at all. Let’s compare it to the case of pain. Admittedly, we have 
already argued that the case of pain is no genuine example because pain is most likely a 
family concept. But assume it is not, assume it were a genuine MR case. The crucial 
difference to the payment case is that pain is indeed a natural phenomenon. Hence, to 
assume pain as a higher-order classification is to assume a natural kind. Payments, 
however, are certainly no natural phenomena. Surely, economists treat payments as kinds 
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in the sense that they use them in generalizations. But nevertheless payments do not occur 
in nature. Whether something figures as a currency or payment method is a matter of 
cultural stipulation and, hence, a convention. We must therefore carefully distinguish 
between genuine natural kinds and kinds by means of stipulation. Since we are free to 
declare any token whatsoever as a particular currency, we should not expect some 
intrinsic nature of the token to bring about its causal economic effects. Such effects are 
simply brought about by fiat. Not only are they functional, they are functional by 
convention. 
 
 
6.2  Approximation cases, idealization cases and intertheory reduction 
 
Temperature, at least in the case of gases, can be reduced to mean kinetic energy of the gas 
molecules. Consider the case of 1 mole of a particular gas. The number of molecules in 
such an amount of stuff is Avogadro’s constant, which is of the order of 1023, a truly 
gigantic number. Now, a certain macrostate of an ideal gas characterized by a particular 
value of the mean kinetic energy of its molecules may very well be instantiated by an 
equally gigantic number of microstates (we do not dispute about a few orders of 
magnitude more or less here), all of which in general include different individual molecule 
velocities which nevertheless lead to the same mean value of the molecules’ kinetic 
energy. Hence, temperature, a property of the macrostate of a gas, is multirealizable by a 
vast number of microstates. While this is in a sense a truly dramatic MR case, this does not 
at all mean that the reduction of temperature to individual molecule velocities or kinetic 
energies is blocked. The different microstates belonging to one macrostate may differ in 
various properties (e.g. the individual molecule velocities), but as far as the relevant 
property is concerned – the mean kinetic energy of the molecules – these states are of one 
kind. Temperature laws may very well be reduced to laws about mean molecular kinetic 
energy despite the fact that the different microscopic realizations differ in various regards, 
since temperature laws do not quantify over the differing properties of the microscopic 
realizers, but only about the property in common. Hence, the temperature case belongs, 
just like the case of water, to our first innocuous MR class of shared intrinsic properties. 
 
But there’s a further complication involved. While in the case of water identifying water 
with H2O (and its various isotopes) is quite straightforward, in the case of temperature 
identifying temperature with mean molecular kinetic energy draws essentially on an 
approximation. Literally speaking, there exists no such property as the mean kinetic 
energy. In fact, in any particular microstate the mean kinetic energy will in general be 
instantiated only by a tiny fraction (if at all!) of the gas molecules. We have a case here 
where the Nagelian bridge principles cannot be recovered as strict identities – neither for 
types nor for tokens! 
 
So let’s have a quick look at the issue of intertheory reduction. Ernest Nagel’s (1961) classic 
account is based on the idea that reduction is a variant of deduction. In a nutshell: to 
reduce means to deduce laws. On such an account a higher-level theory Thigh reduces to 
Tlow if and only if the laws of Thigh may be deduced from the laws of Tlow. With laws as 
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generalizations over property predicates, this leads to the necessity of establishing 
meaning relations between higher and lower-level predicates. Nagel therefore introduced 
bridge or correspondence principles stating that the laws of Tlow in conjunction with the 
bridge principles logically comprise the laws of Thigh.  
 
Cases like our “temperature equals mean energy”-approximation obviously pose a 
problem for this approach, since generally and in fact in many cases Thigh, from the more 
fundamental perspective of the lower theory Tlow, turns out to be only merely 
approximately true though literally false. Hence, the very idea of reduction seems to be 
undermined and the threat of eliminativism is lurking. In order to cope with these 
problems, Schaffner (1967) and Hooker (1981) developed more elaborate accounts of 
reduction. Their basic idea is that to reduce means to formulate an analogous image Ilow of 
Thigh in the vocabulary of Tlow. The trick is that by using the vocabulary of Tlow only, 
reduction is accomplished without appeal to bridge principles or to worrisome token or 
type identities. On such an account the higher-level theory isn’t entirely eliminated. There 
is instead a substitute provided by an analogous theory image. (Obviously, this account 
stands or falls with a proper account of what counts as “analogous”). 
 
So sometimes, indeed, higher-level entities or properties are introduced by means of 
idealization or approximation procedures. While Nagel’s original account cannot cope 
with such cases, other reduction frameworks, most prominently the Schaffner/Hooker 
account, can. It is indeed a sad fact that in a majority of philosophy of mind discussions 
the Nagelian approach is often still the only one mentioned, while philosophers of science 
have discussed so many other options (starting already in the 50’s with Kemeny, 
Oppenheim, Feyerabend, Schaffner, Sneed, Scheibe, Ludwig, to mention just a few). The 
upshot of approximation cases regarding the MR argument is that one must be very 
careful whether the allegedly multirealisable higher-level entities can be obtained  from 
direct compositions of lower-level constituents or by means of approximations only. It is 
neither astonishing nor is it a deep problem that in such cases a naïve Nagelian approach 
of reduction fails, as long as the approximative or idealized nature of the higher level is 
acknowledged. 
 
 
6.3  Higher-level realism, eliminativism, and bottom-up ontologies 
 
The topic of the preceding section touches upon an important ontological issue, a full-
blown discussion of which is certainly far beyond the scope of this paper. It should 
nevertheless be addressed here ever so briefly. It’s the issue of the pros and cons of higher-
level realism. Given the above MR class of approximation cases, it seems that, from a 
rigorous point of view, we end up with outright eliminativism: taken literally, mean 
energy, like other statistic concepts such as the mean woman with her mean number of 1.4 
children (in the sad case of Germany), is a proper and instrumentally useful theoretical 
concept but it doesn’t refer to any real property or entity. From the identification of a 
higher-level property such as temperature with a statistical quantity, the conclusion 
follows that the higher-level property, in our case temperature, also doesn’t refer.  
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Take David Lewis’ explanation of supervenience as another example: “A dot-matrix picture 
has global properties – it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot – and yet all there is to the 
picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but 
patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without 
differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot” (Lewis 1986, p. 14). Do global 
patterns exist? Obviously, they are idealizations from dot distributions. In that sense they 
supervene on the lower-level dot distributions and are, the same time, multi-realizable by 
many distributions. The intriguing “realistic” nature of global patterns can best be seen 
from John Conway’s infamous “Game of Life”, a well-known example of a cellular 
automaton. From a set of perplexingly few and simple rules one gets a gorgeous 
complexity of patterns, a whole universe of “life forms”. And it is more than compelling to 
describe the regular pixel distributions in the Game of Life as stable patterns, which 
themselves sometimes (again very perplexingly) obey higher-level regularities. Not only is 
it compelling, the pattern description seems to be the only appropriate description. Daniel 
Dennett (1991) has therefore plead for a moderate realism about higher-level patterns. For 
in order to cope with the otherwise overwhelming complexity we have no other choice 
than to describe the higher-level goings-on from the, as Dennett would have it, “design 
stance”. 
  
The philosophical consideration of such examples may trigger an endless debate about 
ontology. But whether one sticks with realism (moderate or full-blown), instrumentalism 
or outright eliminativism regarding higher-level patterns, isn’t our primary concern. Our 
concern should be whether the evidence for patterns as lower-level approximations or 
idealizations is in accordance with reductionism or not. So here’s a claim: If for some higher-
order entity or property there exists a bottom-up account that explains the entity or property if not 
literally but to any desired accuracy (for the purposes of higher-level observation and 
measurement), then that bottom-up account is sufficient for epistemic (let alone ontic) reduction. It 
is, moreover, obvious that in such cases we have any reason to assume that the causal 
efficacy of the higher-order entities “drains down” to the lower level, to use Kim’s 
terminology. It’s not the mean woman that “does” anything in the world nor is it gas 
temperature as mean kinetic energy, it is the particular women and particular gas 
molecules in a microstate that act. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The paper’s overall theme was that MR is no unique phenomenon, but that it is itself 
“multi-realized”. Needless to say that this is not the same sense of multirealization as in 
MR itself, but rather a metaphorical use (hence the quotation marks). A variety of different 
classes of MR cases has been carved out in the paper. Here’s again a list of them: 
(1) Shared intrinsic properties 
(2) Shared relational properties 
(3) Functional properties 
(4) Domain-specific sub-types 
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(5) Family concepts 
(6) Kinds by stipulation 
(7) Approximation cases 
This list is probably not exhaustive nor is it meant to be clear-cut. In fact it were a serious 
misunderstanding to assume that the different MR classes are clear-cut. The point is that in 
many cases we need to combine different classes and their corresponding possible 
reductionist recipes! This shall be outlined here, on the fly I will also point out connections 
and similarities to more recent work in the field. 
 
First we may distinguish “real” from “fake” cases. Real MR cases are either grounded in 
shared intrinsic (1) or relational (2) properties. Shared-intrinsic-properties-cases are in 
general innocuous (the case of water), whereas non-trivial cases quite often rely on 
functional properties (3), which can, as we have seen, usually be reconstrued as cases of 
shared relational properties (2). In such cases the higher-level generalizations will be 
structural laws (the harmonic oscillator). As far as I understand him, the idea of structural 
laws also provides the background of Battermann’s (2000) analysis, if only stated by 
means of the concept of universality. 
 
The general idea to restrict attention in MR cases to the causally relevant, shared 
properties can also be found in Shapiro (2000, 2004) and Pauen (2002). Bickle’s (2003) 
ruthless reduction of psychological phenomena to the molecular level can, I think, be 
understood as an attempt to ground psychological multirealizability in shared intrinsic 
molecular properties. Shapiro (2000) has moreover set up an interesting dilemma for MR 
proponents. His concern is about the empirical evidence of the MR thesis and the existence 
of truly interesting and genuine cases of MR. Shapiro argues that in the genuine cases the 
different realizers bring about the function in causally different ways. Hence we should 
not be concerned with property differences of the realizers which do not contribute to the 
function. In Shapiro’s example: whether a corkscrew is made out of aluminium or any 
other steel doesn’t really matter. However, the fact that here exist different mechanisms to 
realize a corkscrew – a winged mechanical device opposed to a gas injection device – is of 
interest. Shapiro’s dilemma now is that either the realizers differ in the causal way they 
bring about the function or they do not. In the latter case we have no interesting case of 
MR at all, if they do, however, then they are really different kinds, because in that case 
only a few shared laws or generalizations will be left – laws or generalizations he 
attributes as “numbingly dull” (Shapiro 2000, p. 649) such as “mouse traps are used to catch 
mice” or “eyes are used to see”. While I basically agree with Shapiro’s analysis, the 
emphasis is a bit different. If all mouse traps bring about the causal effect to catch mice 
then they share this very property and mouse trap “laws”, as generalizations over exactly 
this property, are possible. Admittedly, such generalizations aren’t very instructive, but 
the crucial point is that even “numbingly dull” generalizations subsist only on the basis of 
shared properties – if only, in the extreme, by sharing just one relational property. Of 
course, the fewer commonalities, the less useful the generalizations. 
 
Classes (4) to (7) can in principle be combined both with each other and with classes (1) 
and (2). We have seen some examples already. Family concepts (5) will generally allow for 
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domain-specific sub-types (4) on the basis of shared properties (1,2). Recently, Lewis’ idea 
of domain-specificity was revived by Esfeld and Sachse (2007) in terms of “functional sub-
types”, i.e. a combination of (3) and (4) without, however, further analyzing (3) in terms of 
(1) or (2). Classes (6) and (7) are largely overlooked in the literature, though they most 
certainly play an eminent role, especially the class of approximations and idealizations (7), 
where, strictly speaking, MR proponents only mistakenly assume genuine multirealizable 
kinds. 
 
I should finish with the remark that, admittedly, the paper has an ambitiously wide scope. 
It touches upon many deep philosophical issues which cannot all be addressed adequately 
in just one paper. However, since the issues are deeply intertwined, it is my firm belief 
that when we consider only single pieces of it alone important points will be missing. This 
is also intended by the term “multirealization” (in quotes): the many faces of the MR 
problem. And exactly because of the many faces there is no unique antidote against MR’s 
supposedly anti-reductionistic force. But there is perhaps enough hope that all of the 
various “instantiations” of MR can be dismissed case by case (or class by class, 
respectively). So the paper should eventually be considered an outline of a prospective 
framework of how to deal with the MR problem (or “problems”) from a strengthened 
(type) reductionist perspective. 
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